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BUT DADDY, WHY CAN'T I GO TO
COLLEGE? THE FRIGHTENING DE-KLINE
OF SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN'S
POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
Raising children is expensive.' A couple earning more than $55,000
per year will spend more than $198,000 to raise a child to age eighteen,
and many children then want to go to college. 2 In 1990, nearly 90% of
high school sophomores planned to continue their educations.' When
they went off to college for the 1992-93 school year, the average total
cost for one year at a private four-year college, including tuition and
living expenses, was $17,301. 4
As this suggests, a couple entering parenthood face increasingly
daunting financial obligations. 5 When relationships between parents
fail, the assumed obligations can reach crisis proportions. Consider the
following true story:
My ex-husband is a successful physician, and has the money
to help our daughter with college, but has refused to give her
a dime. his live in girl-friend is not much older than our
daughter. unfortunately my daughter and i don't have alot,
most of the assets and income were hidden before the divorce
hearing, and we pretty much got zero. I only have a few years
of support after a 20 year marriage because I showed i was
incollege and would soon be on my own. As a result i have a
hard time coming up with both our tuition. It is done, how-
1 Ann L. Estill, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economies, 36 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 989, 1076 (1995).
2 Facts and Figures, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND Well PAGE, Chttp://www.childrensde-
fense.org/facts.html#custs > citing Expenditures on Children by Families, 1994 U.S. DEPT. AGRIC.
ANN. REP., Ctr. for Nutrition and Promotion. In contrast, a couple making less than $32,800 per
year will spend $100,290 and a couple making between the two wages will spend $136,320. Id. In
a single-parent family, if the parent is making less than $32,800, that parent will spend $97,710,
and if the parent is making more than $32,800, he or she will spend $198,240. Id.
'Trend in the Well-Being of American Youth, Youth Indicators, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC, STAT.,
U.S. Myr. or Four. 1993, Indicator 59 [hereinafter Youth Indicators].
4 Commissioner's Statement, Are more young people going lo college? Tut: CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 1995, NAT'L CTR. EDUC. STAT. [hereinafter Commissioner's Statement]. For one year
at a four-year public university, the total costs were $9,187."1d.
Eslin, supra note 1, at 1076.
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ever, at the sacrifice of my other two children ... it is from
their child support. We get by on surprising little, while my
car continues to wear out, the house is showing its age, and
I have had to foot the bill for [a] new roof, furnace, and air
conditioner. In fact my first year and a half, i worked two jobs
to help us along, my children have been devastated by his lack
of concern for them. He continues to buy expensive cars,
takes expensive cruises, and vacations, buys expensive furni-
ture, and is building a nice home, then has the nerve to tell
my children that he can't afford something because "your
mother gets all my money." ... Yes, he has the money to help
with tuition, but he doesn't. . . he has always promised my
daughter support for college, but will not honor that prom-
ise. . . . good parents will always help their children, with or
without the court orders, and bad parents will always figure
out a way to dodge their responsibilities. 6
Stories like this ring loud and clear through the halls of Harris-
burg and other state capitals.? In many cases, children in this situation
never make it past high school. 8 In attempts to increase the availability
of secondary education to children in single-parent families, legisla-
tures have passed statutes allowing courts to order divorced, separated
or unmarried parents to help pay their children's post-secondary edu-
cation costs.'
This Note examines whether such legislation violates equal pro-
tection principles. 10 Part I discusses the status of the law regarding this
issue, focusing on recent events in Pennsylvania, in particular on Kline
v. Curtis." In Kline, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that
Interview with "40-ish" in the ChatWeb, March 21, 1996.
7 D.C. Coat; ANN. § 30-401 (1993 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1995);
ILI.. ANN. STAT. ch . 40, para. 513 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-
12 (Burns Supp. 1995); lowA Com ANN. § 598.1 (West 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Cll. 208,
§ 28 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); Miss. Cooa ANN. §§ 93-5-223, 93-11-65 (1994); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.340(5) (Supp. 1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34:23 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. Dom. REL.. LAw
§ 240(1-b)(c)(7) (McKinney Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 15-2-1 (1996); Thrasher v. Wilburn, 574 So. 2d 839 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Butler v. Butler, 496
A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1985) (providing that age of majority for child support purposes is 21);
Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2(1 766, 768 (Miss. 1989) (holding that age of majority is 21); Bull v.
Smith, 382 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. 1989); see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 12-202(a) (2) (iii), 12-
204(i) (1) (1991 Sc Supp. 1995); S.C. Com: ANN. §§ 20-3-160, 20-7-40 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp.
1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15d (1995).
8 Linda Matthews, Divorced Father's Case Raises Difficult Issues of Who Pays Tuition, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1995, at B 11.
9 See supra note 8.
hi See infra parts I—III.
11 See infra part 1.
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a statute giving courts discretion to order divorced, separated or never-
married parents to help pay for their children's college costs violated
the Equal Protection Clause, thus concluding that parental obligations
end at the child's eighteenth birthday.' 2 Part II argues that this reason-
ing ignores the disadvantages facing children of divorced, separated,
or never-married parents as compared to children of intact families in
obtaining their advanced education.' 3 Part III goes one step further,
arguing that all children should be able to bring an action to compel
parental support for post-secondary education when appropriate cir-
cumstances exist. 14
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF POST-SECONDARY
EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT LAWS
For much of the Vietnam War, soldiers under twenty-one years of
age lacked the power to elect those people sending them into the
conflict.'' By the end of the war, however, the 26th Amendment reme-
died this paradox by lowering the voting age from twenty-one to eight-
een.' 6 With this paradox remedied, however, another sprang tip as state
legislatures lowered to eighteen not only the voting age but also the
age of majority, which encompasses more than the right to vote.' 7
Some states maintained twenty-one as the required age for certain
activities but not for others.'' For example, in Montana, an eighteen-
year-old could buy a firearm but could not buy a beer until age twenty-
one.'" While some states like Montana specified the areas for which the
age of majority changed, 2° most legislatures left the age of majority for
courts to interpret. 21
The change affected family law courts when non-custodial parents
sued to lessen their child support obligations, claiming that the lower
age of majority decreased their child support obligations by three
years." Prior to the lowering of the age of majority, court decrees or
12 Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. 1995).
11 See infra part ILA.
14 See infra part HI.
15 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI, § 1.
is hi.
"E.g., Shoal. v. Shoal, 192 S,E.2d 299, 301 (N.C. 1972) (citing recently passed N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48A).
I 8 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-6-1 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1995).
19 Mom. COVE ANN. §§ 16-3-301, 45-8-321 (1995),
10 Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-B-1 (West 1993) (lowering the age of majority to 18 for
"basic civil and contractual rights").
21 Kathleen Conrey Horan, Post-Minority Support fin- College Education—A Legally Enforceable
Obligation in Divorce Proceedings?, 18 N.M. L. Itr:v. 153, 155 (1988).
12 See, e.g., Shoal; 192 S.E.2d at 301.
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negotiated support agreements ordering support until the affected
child reached majority ensured support until the child's twenty-first
birthday.23 With the change, however, non-custodial parents providing
support claimed that support terminated on a child's eighteenth birth-
day, and the courts, whose authority to protect the child of divorce as
its ward only lasts until the child's emancipation, were powerless to
intervene."
For example, in 1972, in Shoaf v. Shoal the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that, as a result of a statute reducing the age of
majority from twenty-one to eighteen, the father's obligation to pay
support for his son terminated on the son's eighteenth birthday. 25 On
June 11, 1970, a trial court entered a separation agreement for Peggy
and Ted Shoaf, including a child support provision for their son, Jeff,
until he reached majority age, which was then twenty-one. 26 A sub-
sequent state statute reduced the age to eighteen, which Jeff had
turned the previous January. 27 Ted made two more payments and then
stopped, arguing Jeff was now an adult for whom he had no obliga-
tion?
In holding for Ted, the court explained that jurisdiction over
children vests in a court when the children's parents separate and
commence divorce proceedings:2g The court further explained that
this authority continues until the child is emancipated at an age to be
determined by the legislature." When the child reaches that age, the
court reasoned, the child no longer suffers from the disabilities that
previously mandated court protection, such as the inability to manage
affairs or enjoy civic rights. 3 ' As a result, the court determined, when
the state reduced the age of majority to eighteen, the court lost all
authority to order Ted to make child support payments to the court's
former ward. 32 The court held, therefore, that the legislature's change
of majority age terminated support obligations at eighteen years rather
than the originally anticipated twenty-one years. 33
23 See, e.g., infra note 27 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
25 192 S.E.2d at 303.
26 Id. at 301.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 302.
39 Shoaf, 192 S.E.2d at 302.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 303.
33 Id.
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Before the 26th Amendment and the subsequent state statutes,
the issue of post-secondary education support raised only a few ques-
tions.34 Problems occurred if parties to divorce had not made plans for
the child's college education, made vague plans, assumed income that
was never realized, or the child was already in college when the di-
vorce occurred." The post-26th-Amendment litigation, as evidenced by
Shoal, however, put past practices in question and past focal points—
the child's preparation for life—aside.
Litigation concerning continuing enforcement of then-existing
decrees hinged on whether courts interpreted statutes as prospective
or interpreted child support provisions as providing support for minor
children only, cutting them off from parental support at age eighteen. 36
Unless protected by statutes specifically allowing for prospective change,"
children like Jeff Shoaf, reaching majority at eighteen, lost their mi-
nority status and the accompanying protection as "wards of the court"
three years earlier than anticipated in the original separation agree-
ment." The courts' ability to increase child support when a child
entered college thus disappeared."
In the area of child support, states have produced three responses
to the change in majority age. Some states allow court-ordered post-
minority support. 4° Other states enforce support orders providing for
post-secondary educational expenses if included in a contract or set-
tlement agreement approved by the court. 41 The largest percentage of
states, however, refuse to recognize a parental obligation to support a
child beyond the child's high school graduation or, if later, reaching
majority. 42 In these states, courts lack jurisdiction over the parent-child
34 See Hon. Edward M. Ginsburg and Anita W. Robboy, Support Education After Age Eighteen,
10 MASS. FAM. L.J. 101, 102 (1993).
36 See id.
56 See Honul, supra note 22. While the bulk of cases in the 1970s involved pre-26t11 Amend-
ment decrees, the passage of time has rendered this issue moot. Id.
37 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07(3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
"Note, Child Support Extended, 10 GoNz. L. Riw. 933, 935 (1975).
19 See id.
40 See supra note 8.
41 MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(5) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(4) (Supp. 1995);
see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a) (A) (Supp. 1995); VA. Coin:. ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie 1995).
42 ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.310 (1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(1.5)(1)HO (1987
& Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07(2) (West 1986 &
Supp. 1996); GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-11-3 (1991 & Supp. 1995); CODE § 32-706(b)
(Supp. 1995); Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); Mien. STAT.
ANN. § 25.222(1c) (Callaghan 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.57 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-364 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT, ANN. § 125:230 (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-4-11(A) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (2) (1995); Oino Rev.
Coot; ANN. § 3109.05(E) (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112(D) (West
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relationship once the child reaches majority and thus can neither
enforce support obligations nor order them."
A. A Survey of Current State Law Regarding Non-Custodial Parents'
Support Obligations for Children's Post-Secondary Education Expenses
Of those states allowing for child support for post-minority ex-
penses, court authority is either specifically granted in a statute or has
been created from court interpretation of otherwise ambiguous statu-
tory language.'" For example, after the change of the age of majority
to eighteen, in 1972, Iowa amended its statute, granting courts discre-
tion to order support for children between eighteen and twenty-two
years old attending high school or pursuing approved post-secondary
education full-time."
By contrast, Washington passed a new statute enabling a court to
order parents in a divorce proceeding to pay reasonable or necessary
support to a dependent child of the marriage." The previous statute
only allowed court-ordered support for "minor" children of the mar-
riage.`" The new statute eliminated the use of "minor" from the statu-
tory language, instead focusing on the duty of support to any depend-
ent child of the marriage." Thus, the new statute opened the door
for court-ordered support during college but contained no specific
authorization."
Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2(h) (1988); S.D. Comilla) LAWS ANN. § 25-5-18.I (1992
& Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-11-102(h) (Stipp. 1995); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a)
(West 1986 & Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.25 (West 1993); see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:309
(West Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 658(c) (1989).
43 See Horan, supra note 25, at 154.
44 E.g., town Cour. ANN. § 598.1(6) (West 1996); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 206-07
(Wash. 1978).
45 IOWA Cone ANN. § 598.1(6) (West 1996) states in relevant part:
The obligations may include support for a child who is between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-two years who is regularly attending an accredited school in pursuance
of a course of study leading to a high school diploma or its equivalent, or regularly
attending a course of vocational-technical training either as a part of a regular
school program or under special arrangements adapted to the individual person's
needs; or is, in good faith, a full-time student in a college, university, or community
college; or has been accepted for admission to a college, university, or community
college and the next regular term has not yet begun ..
Id.
46 WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.100 (West 1986).
47 Childers, 575 P.2d at 204 (construing WASH Raw. Cone ANN. § 26.08.110).
48 Compare id. with WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.100 (West 1986) ("[T]he court shall order
either or both parents owing a duty of support to any child of the marriage dependent upon
either or both spouses to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for support.").
49 See WASH Rev. Cone ANN. § 26.09.100 (West 1986).
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In Childers v. Childers, in -1978, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that the new statute allowed court-ordered support for a child's
post-minority expenses. 5" Mr. Childers was a doctor in private practice,
while Mrs. Childers had been primarily a homemaker, with little em-
ployment experience and no college education. 51 The trial court had
ordered Mr. Childers to pay child support covering tuition, books and
miscellaneous educational fees for each of his three sons, whose cus-
tody had been awarded to Mrs. Childers. 52
The court corn pared the previous statute's use of "minor" with the
new statute's use of "dependent," reasoning this demonstrated the
legislature's intention to base child support determinations upon de-
pendency rather than the statutory age of majority." As a result, the
court noted, a parent's duty to pay for post-secondary educational
expenses depended upon examination of the facts and circumstances
of each case, specifically noting that a child's age is but one factor to
be considered in determining dependency. 54 The court held, there-
fore, that the statute granted the court discretion to award child-sup-
port for post-secondary education expenses where appropriate . 55
More recently, state courts have construed ambiguous statutory
language to award post-minority support at times other than during
divorce proceedings. 5" In Bull v. Smith, in 1989, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that trial courts may order parental support for
post-secondary educational expenses when exceptional circumstances
exist.'' The only statute on point provided that "a husband or wife
declared to be chargeable with the support of his or her spouse or
children . . . may be required to pay for their support .. as may be
determined by the court.'" Alice Bull and Keith Smith divorced and
Alice initially received custody of both children. One daughter, Doreen,
later moved in with Keith, who eventually was awarded custody. 5' When
Doreen graduated from high school, she earned admission into Mid-
50 575 P.2d at 209.
51 Id. at 203.
62 Id. at 203-04.
63 Id. at 204.
64 Id. at 205.
55 Childers, 575 P.2d at 209.
56 See, e.g., Bull v. Smith, 382 S.E.2d 905, 906 (S.C. 1989),
57 10. at 906. Similarly, in Gnirk v. Gnirk, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire !mkt lhat a
trial judge could modify ;i support order, ordering support for post-secondary educati on expenses
not previously included iii the original divorce proceeding. 589 A.2d 1008, 1013 (N.1.1. 1991).
Like the Childers court, the Gnirk court reasoned that the state statute's lack of a reference to
"minor" gave the court the power lo order support for college costs. See id. at 1012.
Ss S.C. Coon: ANN, § 20-70 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1995).
w Bnt 382 S.E.2d at 906.
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land Tech for secretarial training, costing $250 per quarter for tuition,
and Keith sought a continuation of support from Alice. 6°
The court reasoned that extension of child support for Doreen's
training at Midland Tech hinged on whether she demonstrated a
special need for the support. 6 ' To determine whether this need and,
thus, exceptional circumstances, existed, the trial court must consider
several factors. These include the child's ability to do well and whether
the child could otherwise go to schoo1. 62 The court remanded the
controversy, holding that if the trial court found exceptional circum-
stances, it could award educational support beyond Doreen's eight-
eenth birthday.";
The amended statutes and broad court interpretations did not
discourage those parents seeking relief from child support obligations
for post-secondary education expenses. Meanwhile, growing numbers
of young adults pursuing education beyond high school and the con-
tinuing increase in educational costs raised the stakes." Non-custodial
parents shifted tactics, arguing that statutes allowing for court-ordered
support for children of divorce, but not children in intact families,
violated equal protection guarantees.65 Equal protection, the non-cus-
todial parents claimed, commands that divorced parents not be treated
any differently than married parents. 66
Equal protection challenges require a review of the statute allow-
ing court-ordered support.° Neither strict scrutiny nor heightened
scrutiny are required as these statutes do not create classes of people
fit Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. The factors considered are:
(1) the characteristics of the child indicate that he or she will benefit from college;
(2) the child demonstrates the ability to do well, or at least to make satisfactory
grades; (3) the child cannot otherwise go to school; (4) the parent has the financial
ability to help pay for such an education; (5) the availability of grants and loans;
and (6) the ability of the child to earn income during the school year or on vacation.
Id.
63 Id. at 907.
" In 1950, 43% of high school graduates pursued further education as compared to 66% in
1992, as reflected in the increasing numbers with undergraduate degrees rising from 6% to 21%.
Mel Elfin, Does College Still Pay?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 4, 1993, at 96. During the 1980s,
total revenue from universities, colleges and professional schools more than doubled, going from
$14 billion to almost $34 billion, and reflecting a $6,300 average increase in tuition, room and
board per student. U.S. DEPT OF COM. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
T. 262, at 165 & 169 (112th ed. 1992).
65 See, e.g., Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995); LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H.
1993).
"I' See id.
67 E.g., Kline, 666 A.2d at 268.
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based on race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or involve a fun-
damental right."8 These statutes create, instead, social and economic
classifications, reflecting people's marital status and assets. Consequently,
courts only need to use rational basis review." Rational basis review,
the most deferential review of legislative action, requires two steps. 7°
First, courts must determine whether these statutes attempt to promote
any legitimate state interest or public value. 71 If so, courts must deter-
mine whether the statutes and classifications created are rationally
related to accomplishing those interests. In other words, courts ask
whether the statute does what it was written to do."
In LeClair v. LeClair, in 1993, the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire held that the statute authorizing court-ordered support for col-
lege expenses did not violate the state's equal protection clause." The
court held that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that
children of non-intact homes have an equal opportunity to obtain
higher education. 74 The court reasoned that the legislature could ra-
tionally conclude that children of divorce are less likely to receive
financial support from both parents."
After her only son Jeremy's acceptance to Babson College, Ms.
LeClair requested a court order for a reasonable contribution toward
the impending expenses from Mr. LeClair, with whom Jeremy had
resided until he was sixteen." The master ordered Mr. LeClair, owner
of his own business, to pay $2,000 per academic year towards Jeremy's
education, and Mr. LeClair subsequently appealed."
The court reasoned that the statute created two classes of par-
ents—married and divorced." Because these two classes are not based
on race, creed, color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy, nor involve
a fundamental right, the court determined that the classification did
not create suspect classes." Thus, the statute did not require strict
scrutiny review. 8" The court further noted that, although married and
65 See id. at 268-69.
69 See LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1356.
7° Kline, 666 A.2d at 269.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1357.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1352.
77 Id.
7° LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1356.
" Id. at 1356-57.
Id. The court al so reasoned that the statute was not subject to a fair and substantial relation
test as the classifications did not involve "important substantive rights." Id. at 1356. All of these
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divorced parents are otherwise similarly situated under the law as to
support for children seeking post-secondary education, theirs is an
economic classification, entitling the statute to rational basis review
In applying the first prong, the court reasoned that two legitimate
state interests existed in support of the statute: the promotion of
higher education and the extension of protection to children of di-
vorce by ensuring they received opportunities otherwise unavailable
due to their parents' divorce. 82 The court also determined that the
statute satisfied the second prong of rational basis review, as the statute
was neither arbitrary nor without reasonable justification but instead
was rationally related to protecting those interests."
The court recognized that unique problems requiring greater
judicial control may exist in a divorced home, distinguishing it from
intact families where financial support is an unquestioned responsibil-
ity.84 The court concluded, accordingly, that the legislature rationally
determined that children of divorce may be less likely than children
in intact families to receive necessary college financial support from
both parents without judicial involvement. 85 Thus, the court reasoned,
considering that the courts have discretion and are not compelled to
order support in all cases, the statute was rationally related to its
legitimate purposes."
B. Particular Problems in Pennsylvania
More recently, however, Pennsylvania's statute allowing court-or-
dered support did not survive judicial review. 87 Problems first began
when, in Blue v. Blue, in 1994, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that the courts could not order divorced or separated parents to sup-
port their child's post-secondary education due to the absence of
statutory authority in this area." Reginald Blue had completed three
standards of review stern from the New Hampshire, not the United States, Constitution. Id. at
1355.
81 Id. at 1356. Although the court relied on the New Hampshire Constitution's equal protec-
tion clause, the court opined that, in terms of equal protection, the Federal Constitution provided
no greater protection than the state constitution, thus suggesting that judicial scrutiny of the
support statute would he at least as great as that received by a statute challenged under the Federal
Equal Protection Clause. id. at 1355.
82 1d. at 1357.
83 LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1357.
,rd.
ns
56 1(1.
87 Kline, 666 A.2d at 270.
88 616 A.2d 628, 632 (Pa. 1992).
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semesters at Penn State University when his father Ronald left the
family to live with his girlfriend. 8" Reginald subsequently sued Ronald
for support for college." The trial court awarded him $4,600 per year,
provided he applied for and accepted any educational grants or loans
to be deducted from Ronald's obligation. 91
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania struck down the support
order, reasoning that, while the common law recognized a parental
duty to support a minor child, this duty terminated at eighteen. 92 The
court reasoned that only a high school education is necessary to pre-
pare children to reasonably support themselves." Even if further edu-
cation is needed, the court concluded, the state legislature's recogni-
tion of minor children as adults at eighteen stripped the court of
discretion to award support beyond this age. 94 Thus, the court held
that the trial court lacked the necessary authority to award Reginald
support for his costs at Penn State."'
The Pennsylvania General Assembly responded to the Blue deci-
sion by passing Act 62 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, spe-
cifically authorizing courts to order support for college expenses where
equitable."" In Act 62, the Assembly promoted a rational and legitimate
governmental interest in requiring parental assistance for higher edu-
cation for children of divorced, separated, unmarried or otherwise
obligated parents.° In addition to providing the necessary authority
previously found absent by the Blue court, the statute carefully bal-
anced the interests of enabling children of divorce to pursue higher
education with parental interests in foreseeing a definitive end to child
support obligations.98
8° Id. at 630-31.
"' Id. at 629.
01 Id.
92 Id. at 632.
9 : 1 See Blue, 616 A.2d at. 632.
94 Id.
9' Id.
96 23 PA. CONS. SrAT. ANN. § 9327 (Wes1 Stipp. 1995). The statute specifically provided that
"a court may order either or both parents who arc separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise
subject to an existing support obligation to provide equitably for educational costs of their child
whether an application for this support is made befOre or after the child has reached 18 years or
age." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(a).
97 Id. The preamble also notes a specific intention to codify Ulmer v. Sommerville, 190 A.2d
182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963), in which the Superior Cu tort used a two-prong test considering the
financial impact of support on the parent and the child's ability and willingness to pursue a c oarse
of study, and the subsequent line or cases prior to the Blue decision. Id.
98 Jeffrey Muriceak, Comment, Pennsylvania's Legislative Response to Blue v. Blue: Adult
Children May See Green, But Do Both Parents and Children Have Reason to Remain Blue ?, 99 DICK.
L. REv. 477, 498 (1995).
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At the same time, Act 62 minimized court discretion as much as
possible by delineating several factors for consideration." For example,
Act 62 requires consideration of a child's educational costs and whether
the child has the necessary ability and interest in furthering educa-
tion."'" In doing so, the factors reflect the statute's purpose to help only
those students at a disadvantage, rather than all children of divorce or
se paration. 1 " 1
Act 62 had a short life span. In Curtis v. Kline, in 1995, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the statute violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 1 °2 Before the passage of
Act 62, Philip Kline filed a petition to terminate support for his two
children in college.'" After the Act passed, he amended his petition to
include a constitutional challenge to Act 62. 164 The custodial parent,
Bonita Kline Curtis, argued that the difference in treatment reflected
the state's interest in protecting the intact marital family from govern-
mental interference.'" In the alternative, as the LeClair court acknow-
ledged just two years ago, she claimed that the difference reflects the
legislature's determination that children of non-intact families require
educational advantages to overcome disadvantages resulting from the
lack of an intact family.'"
Like the LeClair court, the Kline court reasoned that the statute
did not create suspect classes or implicate an important right.'° 7 The
court concluded, therefore, that Act 62 merited neither strict scrutiny
nor any other heightened scrutiny.'" The Kline court instead con-
ducted a rational basis review but, unlike the LeClair court, found Act
62 unconstitutional nonetheless.'"
99 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4327(e)—(h).
"See id.
10 L See id.
1 °2 666 A.2d at 270.
108 Id. at 267. The Blue decision may have tipped off a rush of petitions by non-custodial
parents to terminate support for their children in college. Murray Dubin, The Tuition Triangle:
Divorced Fathers Rushed to File Papers After the State Supreme Court Ruled They Didn't Have to Foot
Their Children's College Bills; Ex-spouses Are Alarmed; And a Delaware County Legislator Promises
Action, PHILA. INQ.Jan. 13, 1993, at Fl.
104 Kline, 666 A.2d at 267. Kline's challenge to support for the older of the two children was
eventually rendered moot by the child's graduation prior to the Kline decision. Linda Matthews,
Divorced Father's Case Raises Difficult Issues of Who Pays Milian, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at BI I.
As for the other, his daughter Amber, he voluntarily pays for her tuition and employs her in his
business, but claims he brought the constitutional challenge because he is not big on having the
government in my face, telling me what to do." Id.
Kline, 666 A.2d at 269.
"Id.; LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1357.
ID7 Kline, 666 A.2d at 268; LeClair, 624 A.2(1 n 1356-57.
108 Kline, 666 A.2d at 268-69.
108 M. at 270; LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1357.
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The court reasoned that Act 62 divided a larger group—children
needing assistance for post-secondary education costs—into two groups
reflecting the marital status of their parents, children of intact families
and children of divorced, separated or never-married parents. i 10 The
court's rational basis analysis began and ended with this classification,
a classification different than the divorced and married parents distinc-
tion drawn by the LeClair court.'" But unlike that court, the Kline court
concluded that there is no rational reason to treat the two sets of
children differently and that the state cannot selectively empower only
those from non-intact families.' 12
The court dismissed the legitimate interests offered in support of
Act 62 as inconclusive, searching instead for the General Assembly's
actual interests." 3 The court discounted the Assembly's claim that
there existed a rational and legitimate governmental interest in requir-
ing parental assistance for higher education for children of divorced,
separated, unmarried or otherwise obligated parents."' The court rea-
soned such a conclusory statement begged the question of whether the
legislature actually had a legitimate interest in treating children of
non-intact families differently with respect to post-secondary education
expenses." 5
The court also found Bonita Kline Curtis's arguments for dispa-
rate treatment unpersuasive.I 16 The court noted that the group of
children needing Financial help with college costs includes children
from both intact and non-intact families and, in both instances, one
or more parents may be unwilling to help."? The court reasoned that
because this problem occurs in both intact and broken homes, no
legitimate reason exists for favoring children of non-intact families over
children from intact families with married parents."'
The court offered two scenarios in support of its holding that the
classification is arbitrary." 9 First, the court explained that the first child
of a father could use Act 62 to compel support from him after he
divorced the child's mother. if the father later re-married and pro-
duced another child, however, this second child could not compel
u° Kline, 666 A.2d at 269. The court specifically distinguishes this classification from that
interpreted by the LeClair court: married parents and divorced parents. Id. at 270.
111 Id. at 269-70.
112 1d.
113 hi. at 269.
11 ,11d.
115 Kline, 666 A.2d at 269.
"See id,
217 Id.
118 1d. at 270.
119m.
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support for college from the father.' 2° Furthermore, the court ex-
plained that the eighteen-year-old child of a deceased parent could not
sue the surviving parent for support, while an eighteen-year-old child
with both parents living could sue for support.' 21
In sum, the recent history of child support for post-secondary
expenses in Pennsylvania has been tumultuous.' 22 With the Kline deci-
sion, Pennsylvania has joined the majority of states not allowing court-
ordered support for college costs of children from non-intact fami-
lies.'"
II. THE IMPACT OF KLINE
While constitutional challenges to statutes similar to Act 62 have
failed in New Hampshire and other states, the Kline decision encour-
ages arguments in favor of anti-support bills.' 24 In New Jersey, for
example, a state senator introduced a bill prohibiting courts from
issuing orders forcing parents to pay for college as part of a divorce
judgment shortly after the Kline clecision.' 25 If passed, and followed by
other states, these bills would impede progress in protecting children
of non-intact families, exacerbating the disadvantages they already
confront.' 2"According to John P. Paone, Jr., chairman of the New Jersey
State Bar Association's Family Law Section, "It would create havoc for
thousands of divorce cases providing for contribution to college [and]
Whis would send New Jersey into the Dark Ages of protecting and
educating children."' 27
Some people may argue that the Kline decision would encourage
non-custodial parents to be more involved in their child's education,
for they should no longer fear courts watching their every inove. 12m The
reality, however, is that the decision and the New Jersey bill encourage
non-custodial parents to abandon their promises of support without
fear of judicial supervision. 129 An enormous wave of litigation is ex-
' 20 Kline, 666 A.2d at 270.
121 Id.
122 See Supra notes 87-123.
123 Compare Kline, 006 A.2d at 270 with supra note 8.
124 See Dana Coleman, Contentious College Payment Plan Moving Through Senate, N.J. 1,Aw.,
Oct. 16,1995, at 3.
121-'1d.
126 See infra notes 114-243.
127 See Coleman, .supra note 124.
See Kline, 666 A.2d at 270.
129 Coleman, supra note 124.
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petted in Pennsylvania.'s° In New jersey, the bills have already had an
impact.' According to Myra Terry, president of the New jersey chapter
of the National Organization for Women Attorneys, non-custodial par-
ents have been holding off on including college tuition as part of
divorce agreements, likely in hope that. the legislature will strip courts
of their authority to order the necessary support." 2
The Kline court's decision, therefore, does not encourage non-cus-
todial parents to support their children's education, but instead en-
courages them to be less honorable and less responsible than they
would be normally.'" Child support payments typically are made to the
custodial parent, who is meant to use the money for the child's needs.
Non-custodial parents, frustrated by years of not. controlling custodial
parents' allocation of resources, may view the child's eighteenth birth-
day as an opportunity to regain control."' Convinced for years that
custodial parents just added child support to their pools of money,
non-custodial parents could view Kline as the opportunity to cut off the
custodial parents, when in reality they are cutting off children."'
In addition, with the court's decision, attorneys representing non-
custodial parents must choose between compromising their ethical
standards or advising clients not to support their children.''"' if they
advise non-custodial parents to agree to support the children through
college, the attorneys can be sued for malpractice.' 37 If, in the alternative,
they tell non-custodial parents they have no legal obligation to support
their children's education, this statement alone can have influence.'"
These results can be expected to flow from the Kline court's
rational basis review of Act 62.'" But negative policy ramifications
aside, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's rational basis review is
faulty in three ways.H° First, the court fails to recognize that a valid
classification—children of non-intact families—exists and reflects real
differences between them and children of intact families."' Second,
1 "Norman Perlberger, What Will Happen in Aftermath of Curtis; Without Act 62 as a Stick,
Kids Lei t with Parents' Consciences, LEGAL 1NTELLIGENCER, Nov. 6,1995, at 3.
See Coleman, supra note 124.
112 id.
133 L. WErrzsiAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 280 (1985).
13 ' 1 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 272 (Monteinuro, J., dissenting).
See a
3'"44/EITZMANI, .HIPTa note 133, at 278.
37 Id,
138
I " See supra notes 124-43.
I'm Kline, 666 A.2(.1 at 271 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
141 See infra notes 145-246.
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the court does not accept the government interest in education as
legitimate. 142 Third, the court never considers whether a rational rela-
tionship exists between Act 62 and the government's interest.'"
A. The Need far the Classification
The division of children into children of non-intact families and
children of intact families is necessary because it reflects the differ-
ences in economics, parent interaction, academic performance, and
financial aid treatment faced by the two groups.'" The Kline court
majority repeatedly suggests that the statute unjustly treats children of
intact and non-intact families differently. 145 In doing so, the Kline court
refuses to take responsibility for the state's granting of divorces, and
consequent creation of non-intact families.' 45 In 1988 alone, courts put
more than one million children into such situations.' 47 By allowing
divorce, the state has a duty to protect the victims of the state action—
the children.' 48
The Kline court does recognize that Act 62 is focused on chil-
dren. 149 The court's initial failure, however, is to then dismiss the
parents' marital status as irrelevant. 15" Unlike the LeClair court, where
the New Hampshire Supreme Court focused on whether parents were
similarly situated with respect to the obligation of providing educa-
tional support,' 51 the Kline court assumes that children are always on
equal footing because they always need financial support for college. 152
The court's dismissal of the parents' marital status as irrelevant is faulty
because any child support legislation necessarily involves parents' mari-
tal status. 153
Arguably, the Kline court's assumption that children are always on
equal footing regardless of their parents' marital status also could apply
to traditional needs for food, clothing and medical care, not just
142 Kline, 666 A.2d at 271 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
143 See id. at 273.
144 See infra notes 146-246.
145 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 267-70.
146 See id.; Robert M. Washburn, Post-Majority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 319,
327,329 (1971).
147 Youth Indicators, supra note 4, at Indicator 19.
149 Childers, 575 P.2d at 207.
149 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 269.
15" See id. at 272 (Montemuroj, dissenting),
151 Id.
152 Id. at 272 n.4.
153 Id. at 272.
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college costs.' 54 If the court's analysis is applied in these areas, statutes
allowing courts to order subsistence support specifically for children
of divorce also create unfair classifications.'" In the end, such an
analysis could render classifications based on parents' marital status
constitutionally suspect, and, thus, subject to a higher level of scrutiny.'"
Typically, courts do not involve themselves in intact families unless
abuse or child neglect exists. By contrast, courts and legislatures must
step in when the family falls apart and support is needed.'" A child's
desire to continue his or her education does not mean that support is
no longer necessary, or, contrary to the Kline court's apparent reason-
ing, that the parents' marital status is irrelevant.'" Kline himself claimed
he was the one receiving unequal treatment; therefore, marital status
should have been pivotal in the equal protection argument.'"
But the disadvantages that create the need for classification often
begin nnich earlier than when the child is preparing for college—they
begin at the divorce bargaining table.'" Arguably, Kline may encourage
discussion of the child's education during custody determination. These
discussions are unlikely, however, unless the children are close to high
school graduation.' 61
Child support determinations rarely are ripe with bargaining,
consensus and altruism, frequently turning into a trade-off between
spending on adults and spending on children, not to mention the
initial battles over property allocation and custody. 162 During divorce
negotiations, families often become short-sighted and unable to sac-
rifice and save for the child's education or support while the child is
in college.'" If the court is unable to order the more financially secure
parent to pay support, the issue of the child's education will likely
become a bargaining chip for that parent.'" The Kline decision en-
courages the financially more secure parent, often the father, to use
154 See Kline, 666 A,2d at 272 n.4 (Montenuiro,l, dissenting).
166 See id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 272-73.
155 Kline, 666 A,2d at 273 n.5 (Montemuro, j., dissenting). One amicus brief even noted that
Kline nay have lacked standing to contest the equal protection claims of children of intact
fitmilies, thus making the focus of the majority's argument not properly before the court, Id.
See infra notes 162-70.
161 See Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 39, at 102.
152 Estill, supra note 1, at 1075.
163 Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 34, at 102.
164 WEITZMAN, supra note 133, at 280; see Childers, 575 P.2d at 208.
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financial leverage to gain custody of the children, regardless of the
children's best interests.' 65
Where the court decides to give the children to the financially less
secure parent, often the mother, the court does so knowing that it may
be sacrificing the children's education beyond high school.'""A mother
in this situation is faced with a tough decision.'°7 She can either risk
her own financial security or her children's college education." As
one commentator stated, "they have to protect themselves, but they are
in a no-win situation." 169
The assumed risk is later reflected in the different standard of
living experienced by the children and custodial parent.'" There may
be instances in which children of non-intact families have no greater
difficulty in obtaining funds. Those instances are an exception, how-
ever, to the rule that they are at a disadvantage in gathering the
resources and support necessary for education beyond the twelfth
grade."
Compared to the incomes of intact. amities, single parent family
incomes are consistently lower, suggesting financial difficulties are a
major obstacle in affording higher education."' In 1991, forty-six per-
cent of all minors in female-headed households lived in families with
an annual income of less than $ 0,000.' 73 By contrast, about sixty-nine
percent of children in married couple families lived in families with
an annual income of $30,000 or more; only twelVe percent of female-
165 .S'er WEITZMAN, MOM note 133, at 280.
1611 Childers, 575 Rai at 208. While this author recognizes that there are a great number of
single dads ou t there, this Note is directed towards examining the general rule, not the exception,
WILLI/Lim E. DAVIS & EDWARD J. MGCAUL, THE EMERGING CRISIS: CURRENT AND PROJECTED
STATUS or CHILDREN IN THE UNrrEn STATEs 50 (Inst. Stud. At-Risk Students eds., 1991) [here-
inafter CRISIS] (citing C. C. ROGERS & N. ZILL, THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC
POLICY (AJ. Chcrlin ed., 1988)). In 1986, more than 13 million children lived with their mothers
only, 76% more than in 1970, and nearly 1.6 million lived with their fathers only. Id. Also,
disturbingly, divorced fhthers'—not mothers'—groups are frequently the challengers of support
obligations. Estin, supra note 1, at 1072. Even more disturbing is the potential for this problem
to become cyclical, as noncustodial parents are even less inclined to assist with the educational
expenses of daughters than of sons. Kline, 666 A.2d at 272 (Montemuro, J., dissenting) (citing
Judith S. Wallerstein & Sharma B. Corbin, Father•Child Relationships After Divorce: Child Support
and Educational Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1980)),
11 '7 WEITZMAN, supra note 13'3, at 280.
ItiS
169 Id. at 280-81.
170 See infra notes 173-201.
171 See Matthews, supra note 8.
172 Id .
173 	Indicators, supra note 3. at Indicator 15.
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headed households were at this leve1. 17' Thirty-seven percent of intact-
family children enjoyed their parents' $50,000-plus income: 75
Furthermore, children in single-parent households are far more
likely to be impoverished than children in two-parent households: 76 1n
1991, 21.1% of children in all families lived in poverty, but fifty-five
percent of children in families with a female head and no husband
present lived in poverty: 77 The situation is worst for children born to
single parents, who are five times more likely to be poor than children
born to married couples, and worse still when that single-parent family
is headed by a female: 7'
In a majority of mother-father relationships that either never reach,
or fail to remain in, the state of marriage, the children of that union
are left in the mother's custody: 79 As a result, when a child reaches
college age, in the case where neither parent has a de jure obligation
to support, mothers have a de facto responsibility:" This responsibility
is given to mothers despite the fact that they likely have less money
than fathers.'"' In 1991, women's median income was more than $9,000
lower than men's median income; men's salaries averaged forty-three
percent higher than women's.' 82 To make matters worse, mothers also
cannot expect many contributions from fathers.' 83
When a child reaches college age, the mother's dilemma often
grows as she is confronted by an increase not only in education ex-
penses, but also other expenses such as the child's medical insurance,
which non-custodial parents are no longer obligated to provide: 84 Even
when children realize that their mother's resources are more limited,
they are more likely to ask her than their father for support, as they
' 74 Id,
1751d.
176 CRisis, supra note 166, at 51 (citing Di'. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY (1988)). Of the children growing up in the 1970s and spending at least some
time in a single-parent family, almost 75% spent time living in poverty, as compared to 20% of
children living continuously in two-parent families. Id. at 51-52. Also, children from single-parent
funilies are more than ten times as likely as children from two-parent families to spend prolonged
time in poverty during the first ten years of life. Id.
177 Youth Indicators, supra note 3, at Indicator 19.
178 CRISIS„tupra note 166, at 52 (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON CHILDREN 33 (1990)).
17" See infra note 256.
18() WErrzmAN, supra note 133, at 278.
181 Id. at 279.
' 82 Youth Indicators, supra note 3, at Indicator 18.
183 Matthews, supra note 8. Only 6% of custodial parents expected former spouses to help
with college costs../d.
184 WEITZMAN, supra note 133, at 278. The noncustodial parent's other obligations—i.e.,
medical insurance—also end at the child's eighteenth birthday, but in all likelihood the custodial
parent picks up these costs. Id.
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sense their father would rebuff any request made of him:85 One survey
indicated that most children thought their fathers expected a quid pro
quo in return for their financial assistance. 186 This expectation regard-
ing financial support may stem from the lesser emotional support
children receive from non-custodial parents as compared to children
of two-parent families. 187
The Kline court implied that mothers and children should save
and prepare for the child's education before the child graduates from
high school, in part because of the father's providing child support
payments.' 88 While this fantasy may have contributed to the Kline court's
reasoning that children of intact families are in the same position as
children of divorce in terms of their need for assistance, it often is far
from reality. 189 In most divorced or unmarried families, parents have
lower incomes and consequently less money to invest in their chil-
dren. 19" As a result, even where support is paid regularly in divorced
families, children's living standards drop significantly.' 91
The average estimated parental spending on children in intact
families far exceeds the average awarded child support, which often falls
below the poverty level as determined by the Social Security Admini-
stration.'92 As a result, even with guidelines, child support awards are
too low.'93 By contrast, children of intact families do not suffer the same
decrease in financial support because they receive what children of
divorce would label as pre-divorce allocations, resources based on a
two-parent in C0171C. 194
Even where child support is sufficient, the child support obliga-
tion is rarely freely acknowledged and willingly undertaken by non-cus-
185 1d. at 279.
I" Id.
107 Id .
188 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 269.
189 See id.
190 Estin, supra note 1, at 1068.
191 ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W.. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD
SUPPORT 38-39 (1993).
192 Id. at 39.
193 See id. A study of custody agreements and orders in two California counties noted a decline
in the economic well-being of divorced mothers and children, even if support orders were fully
met. ELEANOR E. MAGOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 259-65 (1992).
194 See Estin, .supra note 1, at 1069. In 1981 dollars, in intact families, investment in one child
from birth to 18 years of age ranged from $58,300 per child to $135,700 per child, averaging
38% of that spent on each adult. THOMAS ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN 3 (1984). At
1981 prices, undoubtedly extremely higher now, a four-year public education would add another
$15,492 to those numbers. Id. at 32-33.
September 1996_1
	
CHILD SUPPORT AFTER AGE 18 	 1119
todial parents, as evidenced by the time and money put towards en-
forcing support orders.'• In 1989, only 75.2% of women awarded child
support received any payments, with 51.4% receiving the full amount
and 23.8% receiving partial amounts.'" As a result, many children's
needs during development go unmet, leaving them less prepared when
the Kline court, endorsing the non-custodial parents attitude, cuts off
the potential for support. 1 "7
In addition to the problems created by a lack of support during
development, the limitation of support obligations to a child's minority
years causes a downward mobility for children of divorce.'" More than
half of them sink to a lower socio-economic strata than either parent.'"
Just when they need increasing support, both financially and emotion-
ally, from their parents to pursue an education suitable to their intel-
lectual abilities, financial support ceases or, at best, maintains minimal
levels. 200
Originally, legislatures and courts presumed that divorced par-
ents' interaction with their children would remain the same as it had
been during the marriage. 20 ' That presumption has not held true."'
One study in Pennsylvania indicated that four years after the divorce,
a large number of non-custodial parents had little or no contact with
their children."' A second study noted that 43.7% of all children
surveyed had not seen their non-custodial parent during the past
year."' In both divorced and never-married families, both monetary
and time resources declined."'
Thus, courts must recognize the different levels of emotional and
psychological support received by children of intact and non-intact
families."' When relationships between the mother and father or par-
1 " Kline, 666 A.2d at 271 (Montermtro, J., dissenting). In 1994, Pennsylvania alone spent
more than $100 million to collect more than $840 million. Id. at 271 n.1,
196 Youth Indicators, supra note 3, at Indicator 21.
197 Id. In 1993, only about half of those children awarded support received the Inn amount
as $11.2 billion of the $16.3 billion due was actually paid. Id. at 271 11.2.
198 Wallerstein & Corbin, supra note 166, at 123.
ISO id.
" Id. at 125.
201 Kline, 666 A.2d at 274 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
2(12 Id.; Estill, supra note 1, at 1068.
2"3 CLAIRE BERMAN, ADULT CHILDREN OF DIVORCE SPEAK OUT: ABOUT GROWING UP WITH—
AM) MOVING BEYOND—PARENTAL DIVORCE 115 (1991) (citing Frank E Furstenberg et al., Pater-
nal Participation and Children's Well -Being After Marital Dissolution, 52 Am. Soc. REv. 695-701
(1987)).
204 Id. at 115-16.
215 Estin, supra note 1, at 1068.
2116 See infra notes 229-43 and accompanying text.
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ent and child deteriorate, the child often lacks the necessary emotional
resources to reach his or her potentia1. 207 For example, even though
the aforementioned failures to comply with support orders and agree-
ments may reflect the non-custodial parent's animosity towards the
custodial parent, the child still suffers. 209 Children perceive the non-
custodial parents as not emotionally invested in their education, de-
spite the non-custodial parent's social position and expressed values. 209
In contrast, the child of the intact family enjoys the extra time and
money available within that family:21" As Professor Estin notes,
[E] conomic theories suggest that bearing and rearing chil-
dren is facilitated greatly by the existence of a stable, two-par-
ent family. Such a household can achieve the efficiencies of
a division of labor that traditionally permitted mothers to
develop expertise in child care while fathers specialized in the
role of the provider. . [T]he marital family at its best allows
children to share in a wide range of material and emotional
benefits. 211
The absence of one parent thus often places children of non-in-
tact families at a disadvantage in receiving material and emotional
benefits.212
Furthermore, the excess economic pressures push parents to work
harder so that they have less time to spend with their children:2 ' 3 In
female-headed single-parent families in 1991, 68% of the mothers
worked as compared to 59% of two-parent families where both parents
worked. 214 A 10% differential also exists when comparing the partici-
pation of divorced and married women in the labor force:2 ' 5 While
monetary support and its absence can be quantitatively valued, no
measurement system exists to value the disadvantage children of non-
intact families suffer as a result of the loss of physical nurturing and
emotional connection due to one parent's absence and the remaining
parent's increased work. 216
201 See id.
2"8 Kline, 666 A.2d at 272.
21)°Estin, supra note I, at 1072.
210 Id. at 1002.
211 	 at 1067.
212 See id.
2 " Beller & Graham, supra note 101, at 278.
2 " Youth Indicators, supra note 3, at Indicator 16.
215 Id. a t Indicator 17.
216 Estin, supra note 1, at 1067.
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At the same time, when the relationship between the child and
the non-custodial parent has deteriorated, the child is more likely to
turn to the custodial parent, usually the mother, for help with college
costs:217 The deterioration between father and child often stems from
the deprivation of custody, to which fathers respond by refusing to do
for children what natural instinct would ordinarily prompt them to do. 21s
Mothers, however, as custodial parents, more often stay involved
in their children's academic lives. 216 As a result, children view the
mother's home as their home, and increasingly turn to their mother
for support."" In contrast, in many instances, children see their non-
custodial parents as more distant, judgmental, and selfish, and often
feel psychologically abandoned, because the parents seemingly have
moved on to new lives."'
Family structure also may affect children's academic potentia1. 222
Children of single-parent families do worse in primary and secondary
school compared to children of intact families.22" Specifically, they
receive lower scores on standardized tests, lower grades in school and
drop out of school nearly twice as often as children of two-parent
families."' While finances likely also play a role, according to a Federal
Department of Education study, 71% of children from intact families
go to college, while only 54% of children of non-intact families go to
college."5
For children of single-parent families who are academically eligi-
ble for college, the situation worsens where the child and the custodial
parent cannot afford the entire cost of college, particularly when the
child is interested in a private education."" Private schools frequently
use financial aid forms requiring information regarding the non-cus-
todial parent's income, viewing that person's income and assets as a
factor in determining the child's financial aid eligibility. 22 7 The private
universities expect non-custodial parents to contribute where they have
217 WEITZMAN, supra note 133, at 279.
2I11 Id. at 280 (citing Childers, 575 P.2d at 207).
2141 	 Supra note 133, at 279.
222
221 id
222 closis, supra time 166, at 53-54.
2231d.
221 14. at 54 (citing NATRIELLO ET AL., SCHOOLING DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN: RACING
AGAINST CATASTROPHE (1990), A.M. Milne el al., Single Parents, Working Mothers, and the Mu-
rational Achievement of School Children, 59 Soc. Enuc. 125-39 (1986) and ,1.B. STEDMAN rl Al..,
DROPPING Our: THE EDUCATIONAL VULNERABILITY OF AT-RISK YOUT/ I (1988)).
225 Matthews, supra note 8.
226 Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 34, at 101; see infra notes 229-39.
227 MattlIeWS, supra note 8.
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been involved in their children's lives post-divorce. 228 Thus, non-custo-
dial parents' resources reduce children's scholarship and loan eligibil-
ity, even when those parents refuse to contribute.
The courts and college financial aid offices do not view parental
contributions in the same light.'" The expected contribution is not
limited to the amount contained in the court decree.23° Separation
agreements and divorce judgments are considered the starting point
for what each parent can afford."' The financial aid officers view those
documents as "a 'political document' rather than a binding determi-
nation" of what a parent can afford. 232 They cite parents' moral obli-
gation as sufficient incentive for a child to get support.233
Inclusion of a non-custodial parent's finances may compel denial
of financial assistance to a child, or at least increase that child's net
education costs. 2" Most financial aid is affected by family income. For
example, in 1992-93, a student attending a four-year public university
costing $9,200 that year received about $1,900 in financial aid. 2" Where
the considered income was higher, as would be the case where children
must submit their non-custodial parents' income and assets, that child
received as little as $300. 236 As a result, when non-custodial parents
refuse to contribute, financial aid awards are frequently insufficient. 237
Given the differences facing children of non-intact families as
compared to intact families, the Constitution does not require treating
them as though they were in the same situation. 2" The disadvantages
facing children of divorced, separated or unmarried parents makes the
classification necessary to protect those harmed and, in doing so, is
not patently arbitrary. 239 Act 62 and similar statutes do not make those
children preferred citizens or confer upon them special rights; rather,
Id. In contrast, public universities expect no contribution From non-custodial parent. Id.
229 Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 34, to 104.
23° Id.
231 Id.
232
233 Matthews, supra note 8.
234 See Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 34, at 104.
235 Commissioner's Statement, supra note 4.
236 Id.
237 1d. In addition, if the child lives with a step-parent, the financial aid process frequently
requires disclosure from him or her as well. Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 34, at 104. A
step-parent's refusal to disclose funds can leave the child Further from his or her financial need
For college. Id.
2s" 	 Kline, 666 A.2d at 274 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
239 See id. at 271 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
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they attempt to put them in the position they would have reached had
their family remained intact. 2"
The Kline court, in declaring that a distinction between children
of intact families and children of broken families does not exist, ig-
nored the deleterious effects of the absence of one parent."' In the
case of a divorced family, that change modifies parental behavior in
ways not always foreseen. 242 To ignore these changes and the impact
on children is not only to turn away years of precedent and policy
promulgated by a more representative body but to deny opportunity
to a growing segment of the population. 2"
B. The Legitimacy of Interests in Promoting Educational Opportunities
for Children of Non-intact Families
States have a legitimate interest in promoting educational oppor-
tunities for children of non-intact families to ensure that they have the
same preparation and opportunity in a society where education is
increasingly an individual's greatest asset. 244 The United States Su-
preme Court has repeatedly noted the states' interests in promoting
education. 245 The Kline court, however, denied any legitimate state
interest in education, thereby denying educational opportunities to a
large number of academically eligible children, a result impossible to
reconcile with Pennsylvania's interest in education."'
Children of divorced parents do not cease to be victims of the
divorce on their eighteenth birthdays, but the Kline court's decision
allows their victimization to continue. 247 The state must step in where
morality fails because moral obligation will not always motivate par-
ents.'" The fair policy choice is to hold the non-custodial parent respon-
sible for educational support where that parent would have been ex-
pected to provide support but for the divorce."" If the state does not
make that choice, then it must recognize the equal protection problem
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 274,
243 Kline, 666 A.2t1 at 274.
244 Estin, supra note I, at 1071.
243 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 415 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 933 U.S. 229, 262
(1977).
246 See Kline, 666 A.2(1 at 269.
247 1d.
248 Id. at 274 (Montenntro, J., dissenting).
249 Childers, 575 I'.2c1 at 208.
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for children deprived of economic and psychological advantages due
to divorce. 25" With the Kline court's decision, the children of divorced
parents are victimized twice, first by their parents' divorce and second
by the system claiming to protect them."''
The Perinsylvania General Assembly intended Act 62 to remedy
this situation by promoting education of children in non-intact fami-
lies, ensuring that they have the same educational opportunities as
children from intact homes. 252 The Assembly expressed this interest by
codifying Superior Court decisions prior to Blue, which held that courts
had discretion to order child support beyond a child's eighteenth
birthday.'" The Act functions on an assumption that children of non-
intact families are at a disadvantage in pursuing higher education.'"
The Kline court, however, suggested that the state's claimed inter-
est is a pretext for creating an unconstitutional discriminatory clas-
sification."" The Kline court then rejected the underlying assumption
that a state has a legitimate interest in protecting post-secondary edu-
cation interests of children of divorced, separated and unmarried
parents. 256 In doing so, the court rejected more than thirty years of
developed precedent, subsequently supported by the state legislature
in Act 62.257
Of the investments made in children, education is one of the most
important."" In Fall 1992, college enrollment rose to 14.5 million,
suggesting a college degree has become nearly a prerequisite for a
career.2" Advanced degrees, held by at least seven percent of all per-
sons over twenty-five years old in 1993, 260 are required for many pro-
fessions. 261
Post-secondary education is frequently the greatest asset a parent
can give to a child. 262 A direct correlation between education and
earnings exists: in 1992, the mean earning of a person with a college
250 See id. at 207; Kline, 666 A.2d at 274 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
251 Kline, 666 A.2d at 274 (Montentro, J., dissenting).
.252 Pa. IA 508, 1st Seas., Print. No. 1341 (1993); Kline, 666 A.2d at 274 (Montenntro, J.,
dissenting); see 23 PA. GoNs. STAT. ANN. § 4327 (Supp. 1996) and accompanying history.
253 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327 and accompanying history.
25-4 See id.
255 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 269.
256 See id.
257 1d. at 271 n.3 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
258 Estill, supra note 1, at 1071.
255 All Levels of Education, DIG. EDUC. STAT. 1994.
266 1d.
261 Ginsburg & Rohboy, supra note 34, at 101.
262 id.
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degree was $32,629 and only $18,737 for a high school graduate.'" In
-1992, about 81% of adults with bachelor's degrees participated in the
labor force, compared to only 66% of high school graduates.'" The
unemployment rate also differs between the two, college graduates at
3.2% and high school graduates at 6.8%. 2"5
With the increasing significance of professions and occupations as
well as wealth in society, a college education will become increasingly
vita1. 264' Although requiring parents to help pay for college may cause
parents to sacrifice their own expenditures, educational assistance is
increasingly the method of wealth transfer between generations and
the necessary sacrifice must be made. 2 "7 In 1993, 22% of Americans
over twenty-four years old had completed four or more years of college
as compared to only 17% in 1980. 268
The court implicitly pleads the case for children of non-intact
families whose parents will not pay for their college education. 2 • Their
situation, however, is not improved by the court's decision.'" The
decision instead ensures that children of non-intact families are less
likely to receive the necessary parental assistance in obtaining their
higher education:271 ln the end, the court's decision denies educational
opportunities to academically eligible children, inapposite with Penn-
sylvania's interest in education. 272
Pennsylvania has a legitimate interest in promoting educational
opportunities for children of non-intact families. For most of these
children, their education will be their greatest asset.'" With this deci-
sion, however, the State's interest is undermined and the resulting
educational opportunities are forever lost.
263 Educational Attainment in the United States: March 1992 & 1993, U.S. Census Bureau,
Current Population Reports, Series P20-476, table 19.
264 Outcomes of Education, DIG. EMIG. STAT. 1994.
20
266 See Ginsburg & Rohhoy, supra note 34, at 101.
267 Seejohn H. Langhein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 80
Mint L. L. Rvv. 722, 729-38 (1988) (suggesting that etic:animal support is the primary wealth
transfer for the middle class); Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 34, at 101,
2" All Levels of Education, supra note 259.
269 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 270.
270 Id. at 274 (Momentum, J., dissenting).
271 See Estin, supra note 1, at 1071-72.
272 See Kline, 666 A.2d al 209.
273 See Estin, supra note 1, at 1071.
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C. The Relationship of the Classification to its Purpose
Because it was unable to comprehend the legitimacy of the state
interest in Act 62, the Kline court never reached the second prong of
rational basis review—whether the classification is reasonably related
to accomplishing the state's interests. 274 Because the purpose of the
statute is to help those students at a disadvantage due to their non-in-
tact families, the statute should help only disadvantaged students, not
all children of divorce or separation. Act 62 appeared to do so because
it required the courts to consider the facts of each case, thus reflecting
the possibility of a change in circumstances, ensuring that support is
based only on educational costs borne by the child and used for those
costs alone, requiring that the child have the necessary ability and
interest in furthering education, setting a limit on the duration of
support, and restricting support only to those children making a nec-
essary showing. 276 The statute enables the court to make up for disad-
vantages by requiring that the amount of support be based on educa-
tional costs borne by the child. 276 Although the support award is not
limitless, it is also restricted to past support awards. 277 By focusing on
education costs alone, the statute renders any previous lower standard
of living inconsequential and will not prevent the child from affording
college.278
The statute is also related to its purpose because it limits the costs
paid by a non-custodial parent to educational costs, including tuition,
fees, books, room and board, and educational materials. 279 Parents
would not be liable for any extra living expenses—i.e., car insurance,
travel expenses, health insurance and medical costs. 28° Furthermore,
Act 62 requires support only where the child actively pursues the
education and the necessary support. 281
In addition to looking at the student's ability, willingness and
desire to pursue and complete a course of study, a court applying Act
62 would also consider grants and scholarships the student received. 282
This method of determining whether there is to be support and, if so,
274 See id.
276 Muriceak, supra note 98, al 498.
21'23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(e) (Supp. 1996).
277 See id.
278 See id.
279 Id. at § 4327(c), (j).
28° See id.
281 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(e)(2)—(4).
282 See id.
September 1996]
	
GUILD SUPPORT AFTER AGE 18	 1127
how much, ensures that the child will not be awarded any more than
absolutely necessary.'" If circumstances change, non-custodial parents
can request a modification or termination of support. 284
Also, Act 62 considers non-custodial parents' beliefs that the cus-
todial parent was not responsible for support or needlessly commin-
gled support payments with personal funds. 285 The statute allows the
court to order either or both parents of the child to provide support
for advanced education. 286 Furthermore, the non-custodial parent has
no obligation to contribute to the child's living expenses at home,
unless the student resides there while attending school."'
Act 62 also meets an important policy goal—ensuring that there
is an end to child support. 288 Parents' potential liability ends at the
student's twenty-third birthday, unless exceptional circumstances ex-
ist. 28" In any case, the statute specifically provides that support ends
when the child graduates from college."'
The statute does not make the payment of child support for
advanced education mandatory. 291 It contains a number of factors for
the judge to consider in making a determination. 292 Unless the situ-
ation meets the criteria, the non-custodial parent has no obligation.'"
Act 62 and similar statutes are rationally related to their purpose
because they demand an intensely factual analysis when determining
2831d .
284 ht. at § 4327(h),
288 See id. at § 4327(g).
286 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(a).
287 Id. at § 9327(g).
2m Id. at § 4327(0..
289 Id. at § 4327(0 (3).
29° Id. at § 4327(0 (2).
291 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(a).
292 See id. at § 4327.
293 1d. at § 4327(a), (e). Section 4327(c) states:
Other relevant factors—After calculating educational costs and deducting grants
and scholarships, the court. may order either parent or both parents to pay all or
part of the remaining educational costs of their child. The court shall consider all
relevant factors which appear reasonable, equitable and necessary, including the
following: (1) The financial resources of both parents; (2) The financial resources
of the student; (3) The receipt of educational loans and other financial assistance
by the student; (4) The ability, willingness and desire of the student to pursue and
complete the course of study; (5) Any willful estrangement between the parent and
student caused by the student after attaining majority; (6) The ability of the student
to contribute to the student's expenses through gainful emplopnent; the student's
history of employment is material under this paragraph; (7) Any other relevant
factors.
Id. at § 4327(e).
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who contributes and how much. 294 Given that cases vary factually, the
weight given to each factor may differ from case to case.!"'' The child's
academic ineptitude or the poverty of the non-custodial parent may
render other factors inconsequentia1. 296 Of course, there will be situ-
ations in which children barely fall short of the criteria to receive
support from their non-custodial parent, just as there are situations in
which children of intact families do not receive the necessary support
to go to college. 297 Act 62 and its fellow statutes provide, however, for
equality in opportunity, not necessarily uniformity. 298
III. A BROADER SOLUTION: MAKING THE ACTION AVAILABLE
TO Au. CHILDREN
If the Kline court's view is increasingly accepted, either courts or
legislatures, or both, must entitle all children—regardless of family
status—to educational support from parents to avoid the potential
harm of this decision.299 The Kline court might have been more accept-
ing of a legislative entitlement to post-secondary education or a gen-
eral requirement that parents, regardless of marital status, assist their
children in obtaining such an education. 3U9 This legislation could avoid
the equal protection problem in Kline while promoting a legitimate
state interest."' Instead of limiting the opportunity to sue for support
to children of non-intact families, this should be an option for all
children. 3U2
The Kline court held that the Equal Protection Clause is violated
by a statute that treats children of divorce in need of assistance differ-
ently than children of married families in need of assistance. 803 If the
state legislature passed a statute also permitting children of intact
families to sue either or both parents, the difference bothering the
Kline court would disappean"4 The Kline court seemed accepting of a
2" See id.; Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 34, at 102,
210 id.
296 See id.
2117 Kline, 666 A.2d at 273 (Moritenntroj, dissenting).
2914
2151 See Ginsburg & Robboy, supra note 34, at 101.
"See Kline, 666 A.2d at 269.
:o See id.
62 See info note 311 (discussing the value of higher education),
3" Kline, 666 A.2d at 270.
511 See id. For a broader discussion of this concept, sec generally David L. Sage II, Note, Post
Secondary Education: Why Can Johnny Read Even Though His Parents Are Happily Married, 29 J.
FAM. L. 923 (1991).
September 1906]	 CHILD SUPPORT AMR AGE' 18 	 1129
legal entitlement to higher education for children. 3"5 The court spe-
cifically limited its ruling to instances where there is an "absence of an
entitlement on the part of any individual to post-secondary education,
or a generally applicable requirement that parents assist their adult
children in obtaining such an education." 306
The state's interest in the education of its citizens is commonly
accepted by courts as a legitimate interest that satisfies rational basis
review." Public state universities and community colleges abound in
this country, evidence of each state's interest in educating its citizens.
A statute requiring parents to assist their children in obtaining post-
secondary education would likely increase the education of the popu-
lace. Furthermore, the availability of the action would ensure that
parents passed on education to their children, possibly the greatest
asset conveyed in today's society."
Statutes eradicating the classification deemed offensive by the
Kline court could provide factors for courts to use to determine if the
child deserved support and, if so, how much." The use of factors and
judicial discretion would ensure that the statute is rationally related to
its purpose—to provide support for children's advanced education
where the parents can reasonably afford it but refuse to do so.'""
Because of the larger group of children that would be helped by the
statute, additional factors might be necessary.'" For example, courts
might want to consider whether a parent would contribute absent a
3()5 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 269-70.
st Id.
Id. at 273 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
"See Ginsburg & Robboy, .supra note 34, at 101.
"See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4327(c).
311) See supra notes 258-81.
31 I See, e.g., Newburg v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038 (N,]. 1982). The New . Jersey Supreme
Court considered 12 factors:
(1) whether the non-custodial parent would contribute to the child's education
absent the divorce (easily changeable to whether the parent would contribute
ahseni a court order); (2) the reasonableness of ihe child's higher education
expectations in relationship to the background, values, and goals of the parent; (3)
the cost of the requested education; (4) the ability of the . . . parent. to pay the
casts; (5) the relationship of the requested contribution to the kind of education
sought by the child; (6) the financial resources of the parents; (7) the commitment
and aptitude of the child fOr the requested education; (8) the financial resources
of the child; (0) the ability of the child to earn income during school year or on
vacation; (10) the availability of financial aid to the student; (I 1) the relationship
between the child and the parents, including mutual affection and shared goals as
well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship
()I' the education, the prior training and future goals of the child.
Id. at 1038-30.
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court order and the reasonableness of the child's goals in light of the
background, goals and values of the parents.'''
Also, most parents, even Kline, want their children to earn a
college degree's They would rather avoid, however, the personal cost
of that education.s" But why should married parents, especially those
with college degrees, be able to avoid the cost when they do not feel
an obligation to help their children prepare for society?
A statute creating an entitlement to post-secondary education for
all children would ensure that what is presumed by the financial aid
system is carried out for both children of intact and non-intact fami-
lies.s's In either situation, the parent from whom the college financial
aid officer expects a contribution will be required to provide that
support. If vigorously enforced, parents, aware of the legal obligation,
may be more likely to contribute more than what the financial officer
would find necessary, thus reducing the burden on the financial aid
system, the judicial system and the system of federally subsidized loans
and federal and state grants.
The strongest, most likely argument in opposition to such a statute
is that it would infringe upon the constitutional privacy of intact fami-
lies regarding the education of children.s' 6 At the moment, courts are
allowed into the family only where there has been abuse, neglect or
the family is falling apart."" While the legislatures' ability to control a
child's education has been limited, the legislatures' ability to create a
cause of action for children of financially-able-but-unwilling parents
has not been precluded.s's
The United States Supreme Court's Wisconsin v. Yoder and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters can be distinguished in that both cases involved a
question of restricting parental choice for their minor child's educa-
tion." Any statute would only apply to majority-aged persons. In addi-
tion, protection of privacy in adult relationships is typically limited to
312 /d. at 1038.
113 As of fall, 1995, Kline was paying for his daughter's tuition voluntarily, even helping her
buy a car. Matthews, supra note 8, at B11.
511 See Estill, supra note 1, at 1080.
515 See supra notes 229-39 (discussing financial aid procedures).
"'Kline, 666 A.2d at 273 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
517 Id.
515 Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (holding that state cannot compel
school attendance beyond eighth grade where family's religious beliefs are compromised));
Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(holding that state could not compel public school attendance for all children between the ages
of 8 and 16).
51 • See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
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intimate male-female relationships, as evidenced by Griswold v. Con-
necticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird and Bowers v. Hardwick.""
Many of the reasons for supporting children of non-intact families
in their pursuit of education apply to children of intact families:32 i
While a statute allowing court-ordered support for college in certain
circumstances may disrupt some families, the idea is worth contempla-
tion.322 If nothing else, the Kline court likely would be satisfied.323
CONCLUSION
Children, lacking representation, are possibly the weakest mem-
bers of society. As such, their weakness must be recognized, lest basic
principles of fairness be sacrificed. While the classification created by
Act 62 does discriminate, it does so because of the disadvantage that
exists, a disadvantage that compels courts to rule with equity, not
uniformity.
The Kline court's holding, however, pushes society closer to the
view that only parental self-interest compels support of children. 324 This
view supports treating the parent-child relationship similarly to a con-
sumer-product relationship. 325 When the non-custodial parent loses
interest in the child, he can cast that child aside to pick up a new item
of interest. 326 The Kline decision gives support to this view. 321
This view is gaining support elsewhere as wel1. 328 The recent bills
in New Jersey, a state where courts have interpreted ambiguous statutes
to allow court-ordered support, represent further steps in the wrong
direction. The time has come, instead, for steps in the other direction.
The responsibility of raising a child "requires a 'personal commit-
ment' to how the child turns out." 329 If children of non-intact families
cannot benefit from the sense of responsibility and altruism driving
married parents, then they should at least have the opportunity to
improve their lives themselves with further education. The growing
view that children going through divorce are commodities to be bar-
32a See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 447 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
321 See supra notes 309-17 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 301-22 and accompanying text.
323 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 270 & n.5.
324 See id. at 269.
325 See Estin , supra note 1, at 1080.
:326 Id.
327 See Kline, 666 A.2d at 270.
328 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
329 Estin, supra note 1, at 1081.
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gained and traded, encouraged by the Kline court, begins with the
difference in resources between children of non-intact families and
children of intact families. If this concept and the fate of children in
single-parent families are accepted, instead of focusing on leveling the
playing field ahead of children on their eighteenth birthdays, the law
will allow the loss of skills, morals and talents that occurred during the
child's development to remain lost forever. 330
CHARLES F. WILLSON 331
339 Id. at 1087.
°5" Special thanks to Prof. Sanford N. Katz. This article is dedicated to my favorite single mom
and her son.
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